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THE COURT
"Roberts Is at Court's Helm, But He Isn't Yet in Control"
The New York Times
July 2, 2006
Linda Greenhouse
As the dust settled on a consequential
Supreme Court term, the first in 11 years
with a change in membership and the first in
two decades with a new chief justice, one
question that lingered was whether it was
now the Roberts court, in fact as well as in
name.
The answer: not yet.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. was clearly
in charge, presiding over the court with
grace, wit and meticulous preparation. But
he was not in control.
In the court's most significant nonunanimous
cases, Chief Justice Roberts was in dissent
almost as often as he was in the majority.
His goal of inspiring the court to speak
softly and unanimously seemed a distant
aspiration as important cases failed to
produce majority opinions and members of
the court, including occasionally the chief
justice himself, gave voice to their
frustration and pique with colleagues who
did not see things their way.
The term's closing weeks were particularly
ragged. The court issued no decision in a
major patent case that had drawn intense
interest from the business community,
announcing two months after the argument,
over the dissents of three justices, that the
case had been "improvidently granted"-they
should not have agreed to decide it-in the
first place.
So if it wasn't yet the Roberts court, what
exactly was it?
Perhaps it was the Kennedy court, based on
the frequency with which Justice Anthony
M. Kennedy cast the deciding vote in
important cases.
Or perhaps it was more accurately seen as
the Stevens court, reflecting the ability of
John Paul Stevens, the senior associate
justice in tenure as well as in age, to deliver
a majority in the case for which the term will
go down in history, the decision on military
commissions that rejected the Bush
administration's view of open-ended
presidential authority.
Chief Justice Roberts did not participate in
that case because he had ruled on it a year
earlier as an appeals court judge. Based on
his vote to uphold the administration's
position then, he almost certainly would
have joined Justices Antonin Scalia,
Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. Alito Jr.,
the newest member of the court, in dissent.
If none of these labels-Roberts court,
Kennedy court, Stevens court-seem to fit
precisely, it is probably because what the
Supreme Court really was in its 2005-6 term
was a court in transition.
For the justices, it was a time of testing, of
battles joined and battles, for the moment,
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postponed.
The term's early period of unanimity, during
which cases on such contentious subjects as
abortion and federalism were dispatched
quickly, with narrowly phrased opinions,
reflected agreement not on the underlying
legal principles but rather on the desirability
of moving on without getting bogged down
in a fruitless search for common ground.
This was especially so in the term's early
months, when Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
was still sitting but was counting the days
until a new justice could take her place.
Once Justice O'Connor retired in late
January, after Justice Alito's confirmation,
and as the court moved into the heart of the
term, some of the court's early inhibitions
seemed to fall away. Yet when its most
conservative members reached out
aggressively to test the boundaries of
consensus in the term's major environmental
case, Justice Kennedy unexpectedly pushed
back and left them well short of their goal.
In that case, Chief Justice Roberts along
with Justices Alito, Scalia and Thomas tried
to cut back on federal regulators' expansive
view of their authority under the Clean
Water Act to define wetlands.
Justice Kennedy also deserted the
conservatives in a redistricting case from
Texas when he found a violation of the
Voting Rights Act in the dismantling of a
Congressional district that had previously
had a Mexican-American majority. The
action of the Republican-led Texas
Legislature had deprived the Latinos of the
ability to elect the candidate of their choice,
Justice Kennedy said, leaving Chief Justice
Roberts to complain in dissent, "It is a sordid
business, this divvying us up by race."
Nonetheless, there was little doubt that in its
transition, the court was becoming more
conservative. A statistical analysis by Jason
Harrow on the Scotusblog Web site showed
that Justice Alito voted with the
conservative justices 15 percent more often
than Justice O'Connor had.
A separate analysis, by the Supreme Court
Institute at Georgetown University Law
Center, showed that Justice Alito and Chief
Justice Roberts had the highest agreement
rate of any two justices in the court's
nonunanimous cases, 88 percent, slightly
higher than the agreement rate between
Justice O'Connor and Justice David H.
Souter in the first half of the term, 87.5
percent.
Chief Justice Roberts agreed with Justice
Scalia in 77.5 percent of the nonunanimous
cases and with Justice Stevens, arguably the
court's most liberal member, only 35 percent
of the time. The least agreement between
any pair of justices was between Justices
Alito and Stevens, 23.1 percent.
The court decided 69 cases with signed
opinions in the term that began on Oct. 3
and ended on June 29. Nearly half were
decided without dissent, a greater number
than usual, although not dramatically so.
Sixteen cases were decided by five-justice
majorities, either 5 to 4 or 5 to 3, a
proportion very close to the 10-year average.
One measure of the court's shift to the right
is in dissenting votes. In the previous term,
the justice who dissented least often was
Stephen G. Breyer, who dissented in 10 of
the term's 74 decisions. But this term, he had
the second-highest number of dissents, 16;
Justice Stevens had the most, 19. Justice
Thomas and Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and Souter were also frequent dissenters. Of
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those who served the full term, Chief Justice
Roberts had the fewest dissents, seven.
Justice Kennedy had the second fewest, with
nine.
Chief Justice Roberts's dissents, while few,
came in some important cases. In addition to
dissenting from the Voting Rights Act
portion of the Texas redistricting decision,
he also dissented from a decision reopening
a 20-year-old death penalty case on the basis
of new evidence; a federalism case, in which
the majority found the states not immune
from private bankruptcy suits; and a ruling
that invalidated the personal assertion of
authority by John Ashcroft, the former
attorney general, to penalize doctors in
Oregon who follow that state's Death With
Dignity Act and prescribe lethal doses of
medication for terminally ill patients who
request it.
The court's next term, which begins Oct. 2,
looms as a major test of the justices'
fortitude and ability to work together, with
cases challenging precedents on abortion
and affirmative action already on the docket.
With the court having indicated in Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld, the military commission case,
that lawsuits now pending in the lower
courts on behalf of dozens of detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, are still alive, the
justices are likely to have further
opportunities to address the profound issues
of presidential power and judicial authority
that these cases raise. This time, the chief
justice will not need to stay silent, and the
country that is just getting to know him will
hear his voice.
Following are summaries of the term's major
rulings.
Presidential Power
The court repudiated the Bush
administration's plan to use military
commissions to try Guantanamo detainees,
ruling 5 to 3 that the commissions were
unauthorized by statute and violated a
provision of the Geneva Conventions.
The majority opinion in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, No. 05-184, by Justice Stevens,
set minimum procedural protections that any
future commissions, even those authorized
by Congress, would have to provide.
Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer joined the opinion. Justices Scalia,
Thomas and Alito dissented. Chief Justice
Roberts, who had voted as an appeals court
judge to uphold the commissions, did not
participate.
Elections
A splintered decision rejected a challenge to
the Republican-driven mid-decade
redistricting of Texas's Congressional map,
finding that it was not an impermissible
partisan gerrymander. Justice Kennedy
wrote the opinion in League of United Latin
American Citizens v. Perry, No. 05-204.
Agreeing with the judgment on the
gerrymander challenge were Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia and
Thomas. Justices Stevens and Breyer
dissented. Justices Souter and Ginsburg
expressed no view on the issue, making the
vote 5 to 2 to 2.
In the same case, the court ruled that the
dismantling of a district in southwestern
Texas with a Latino majority, an action the
State Legislature had taken to shore up the
faltering prospects of the Republican
incumbent, violated the Voting Rights Act.
On this question, Justice Kennedy spoke for
a 5-to-4 majority that included Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.
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"exclusionary rule."
The court voted 6 to 3 to strike down
Vermont's campaign finance law, which
both limited the amount that candidates
could spend on their own campaigns and
placed the country's lowest ceilings on
contributions to candidates from individuals
and political parties.
The fragmented majority did not offer a
unified approach to contribution limits,
leaving the court's path in this area
uncertain. Justice Breyer wrote the
controlling opinion in the case, Randall v.
Sorrell, No. 04-1528, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. Justices
Kennedy, Thomas and Scalia joined the
judgment.
Criminal Law
In Georgia v. Randolph, No. 04-1067, the
court held that when the police lack a search
warrant, they cannot enter a home if one
occupant objects, even if another occupant
gives permission. The vote was 5 to 3, with
Justice Alito not participating. In his
majority opinion, Justice Souter said the
decision comported with "widely shared
social expectations" about privacy in the
home. Chief Justice Roberts filed his first
dissenting opinion in this case. Justices
Scalia and Thomas also voted in dissent.
The court ruled that evidence the police find
when they search a home to execute a search
warrant can be admitted in court despite an
officer's failure to observe the constitutional
requirement to "knock and announce" before
entering. Justice Scalia, writing for the 5-to-
4 majority, said the ordinary rule against
admitting unconstitutionally obtained
evidence should not apply in this
circumstance-nor, he implied, in many other
circumstances currently governed by the
This case, Hudson v. Michigan, No. 04-
1360, was argued for a second time after
Justice Alito joined the court; his vote with
the majority determined the outcome. The
others in the majority were Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Thomas and Kennedy.
The court was unanimous in ruling that
inmates facing execution by lethal injection
can invoke a federal civil rights law to
challenge the state's choice of drugs and the
manner in which they are administered. The
decision, Hill v. McDonough, No. 05-8794,
opened the door to lawsuits that would be
prohibited by tight restrictions on petitions
for habeas corpus. Justice Kennedy wrote
the opinion.
The court ruled 5 to 3 that new evidence in a
Tennessee murder case, including DNA
evidence, sufficiently undermined the
prosecution's theory of the case to require a
new federal court hearing for the man who
was convicted and sentenced to death for the
crime 21 years ago.
The case, House v. Bell, No. 04-8990, was
the first in which the court factored the
results of modem DNA testing into
consideration of whether a prisoner might
qualify for a chance at habeas corpus that
would otherwise be prohibited by procedural
obstacles. Justice Kennedy wrote for the
majority. Chief Justice Roberts dissented,
along with Justices Scalia and Thomas.
Justice Alito did not participate.
The court ruled 6 to 3 that foreign criminal
defendants who have not been notified of
their right under an international treaty to
contact one of their country's diplomats are
not entitled to special accommodation from
courts in the United States. The decision,
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Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, No. 04-10566,
rejected claims brought under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations by
foreign citizens convicted in Oregon and
Virginia. Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the
majority. Justices Breyer, Stevens and
Souter dissented.
In a unanimous opinion, the court ordered a
new trial for an inmate on South Carolina's
death row on the ground that an evidentiary
rule used in that state's courts had prevented
the inmate from putting on a complete
defense. Justice Alito, writing his first
opinion for the court, said the rule was
irrational and arbitrary. The case was
Holmes v. South Carolina, No. 04-1327.
The court was deeply split on a basic
question of death penalty law: the validity of
the death penalty statute in Kansas under
which a death sentence is automatic if the
jury finds that the mitigating evidence and
aggravating evidence are of equal weight.
Voting 5 to 4 in an opinion by Justice
Thomas, the court upheld the law, which the
State Supreme Court had declared
unconstitutional. Justice Alito's vote,
following a reargument after he joined the
court, made the difference. Justices Souter,
Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented in
the case, Kansas v. Marsh, No. 04-1170.
The court considered defendants' rights to
cross-examine the state's witnesses, a right
protected by the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment, in a pair of cases that
were decided in a single opinion by Justice
Scalia.
In the first part of the opinion in Davis v.
Washington, No. 05-5224, the court was
unanimous in ruling that a crime victim's
emergency telephone call to 911 can be
introduced as evidence at trial, even if the
victim is not present for cross-examination,
because a call to 911 does not produce the
kind of "testimonial statement" to which the
Confrontation Clause is addressed.
The court then went on to hold, by a vote of
8 to 1, with Justice Thomas dissenting, that a
crime victim's statement to police officers
who arrive at a scene should be considered
"testimonial" if the police are investigating
the crime rather than providing emergency
assistance. Such a statement should
therefore be banned from the trial if the
person who gave it is not available for cross-
examination, Justice Scalia said.
In another Sixth Amendment case, on the
right to the assistance of counsel, the court
ruled 5 to 4 that defendants who are wrongly
deprived of the right to hire a lawyer of their
choice are entitled to have a conviction
overturned without the need to show that the
first-choice lawyer would have achieved a
better result. Justice Scalia wrote the opinion
in the case, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,
No. 05-352, joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.
Government Authority
The court ruled 6 to 3 that John Ashcroft,
the former attorney general, acted without
legal authority when he declared that doctors
in Oregon who followed the procedures of
that state's Death With Dignity Act to help
patients commit suicide would lose their
federal prescription rights and thus forfeit, as
a practical matter, their ability to practice
medicine.
No statute authorized the attorney general to
take such action unilaterally contrary to "the
background principles of our federal
system," Justice Kennedy said in the
majority opinion. The decision, Gonzales v.
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Oregon, No. 04-623, was a rebuff of the
Bush administration, which had embraced
Mr. Ashcroft's personal fight against assisted
suicide and carried on the case after he left
the government.
Chief Justice Roberts joined a dissenting
opinion written by Justice Scalia. Justice
Thomas also dissented. Justice Alito was not
yet on the court when the case was decided,
with Justice O'Connor in the majority, on
January 17.
A pair of decisions on the question of state
immunity from suit, also issued in January,
before Justice Alito joined the court, gave
strong indications that the Rehnquist court's
federalism battles were far from over.
The court was unanimous in permitting a
disabled Georgia prison inmate's lawsuit
against the state to go forward under the
Americans With Disabilities Act. But the
unanimity was achieved only because the
court limited the decision, Goodman v.
Georgia, No. 04-1203, to little more than the
statement of a truism: that Congress has the
power to make the states liable to lawsuit
when they violate the Constitution.
In this case, the inmate claimed that his
mistreatment had been so egregious as to
violate not only the disabilities law, but also
the Constitution. Justice Scalia's opinion
said that to this extent, the lawsuit could
proceed.
In the second decision, the court split 5 to 4
in ruling that states are not immune from
private lawsuits brought under federal
bankruptcy law. Justice O'Connor joined the
majority opinion by Justice Stevens in this
case, Central Virginia Community College v.
Katz, No. 04-885. The dissenters were Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy
and Thomas, who wrote the dissenting
opinion supporting state immunity.
The court ruled that as a matter of
constitutional due process, the government
must take reasonable steps to make sure that
homeowners have been notified before it
sells a house for nonpayment of taxes. Chief
Justice Roberts wrote for the 5-to-3 majority
in this case, Jones v. Flowers, No. 04-1477.
Justices Thomas, Scalia and Kennedy
dissented, and Justice Alito did not
participate.
The justices ruled 7 to 1 that the Postal
Service may be sued by people who trip
over packages that letter carriers have
carelessly left in their path. The majority
opinion by Justice Kennedy in this case,
Dolan v. United States Postal Service, No.
04-848, was based on an interpretation of
the Federal Tort Claims Act, not on the
Constitution. Justice Thomas dissented, and
Justice Alito did not participate.
Environment
A fractured decision in the term's major
environmental case, defining federal
jurisdiction over wetlands in the Clean
Water Act, did not produce a majority
opinion but did retain the ability of the
government to continue enforcing the 1972
statute vigorously.
The court split 4 to 1 to 4 in the case,
Rapanos v. United States, No. 04-1034, with
Justice Kennedy in the middle. One group of
four-Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito, and
Chief Justice Roberts-denounced federal
regulators' open-ended approach to wetlands
as "beyond parody" and would have
redefined the term to land adjacent to open
water and actually wet most of the time.
121
The other foursome, Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, would have
deferred to the longstanding judgment of the
Army Corps of Engineers that a "wetland"
can often appear dry and can be miles from a
body of water, as long as it sometimes
performs a filtering or runoff-control
function. Justice Kennedy voted with the
first group to send the case back to a lower
court, but he proposed a standard much
closer to that of the Stevens group.
In a second case under the Clean Water Act,
the court ruled unanimously that operators
of hydroelectric dams must meet a state's
water quality requirements to qualify for a
federal license. Justice Souter wrote the
opinion in this case, S. D. Warren Company
v. Maine Board of Environmental
Protection, No. 04-1527.
Religion
In a significant application of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, the court ruled 8
to 0 that a small religious sect based in
Brazil has the right to import a
hallucinogenic tea that the federal
government had wanted to seize as a banned
narcotic.
The tea, known as hoasca, is central to the
sect's rituals, Chief Justice Roberts noted in
his opinion for the court. He said the
government had not met the religious
freedom act's demanding standard for
applying a generally applicable law-federal
narcotics law, in this instance-in a way that
impinges on religious observance. Justice
Alito did not participate in the case,
Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente
Uniao do Vegetal, No. 04-1084.
Education
Voting 8 to 0, the court upheld a federal law
that requires universities to forfeit all federal
financing if any part of the university does
not provide military recruiters with the same
access to students as it provides other
potential employers.
The law, known as the Solomon
Amendment, was challenged by a coalition
of law schools that objected to the military's
exclusion of openly gay men and women.
The law schools argued that their First
Amendment rights to free speech and
association had been violated by the
requirement that they open their doors to
military recruiters.
Writing for the court in this case, Rumsfeld
v. Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights, No. 04-1152, Chief Justice Roberts
said the speech in question was that of the
government, not of the law schools, which
he noted remained free to criticize the
military and to express their views on its
policies. Justice Alito did not participate.
The court ruled 6 to 2 that parents who
disagree with a public school system's
special-education plan for their children
have the legal burden of proving that the
plan will fail to provide the "appropriate"
education that a federal law guarantees to
children with disabilities. Justice O'Connor
wrote the decision in the case, Schaffer v.
Weast, No. 04-698. Chief Justice Roberts
did not participate, and Justice Alito was not
yet on the court.
Separately, the court ruled 6 to 3 that parents
who prevail at a special-education hearing
are not entitled to reimbursement for the cost
of hiring expert witnesses. Justice Alito
wrote this opinion, Arlington Central School
District v. Murphy, No. 05-18. Justices
Souter, Breyer and Stevens dissented.
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Employees' Rights
The court gave employees substantially
enhanced protection against retaliation for
complaining about discrimination on the job.
Justice Breyer wrote the opinion in the case,
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway
Company v. White, No. 05-259, which
interpreted the anti-retaliation provision of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The court defined retaliation broadly as any
"materially adverse" employment action that
"might have dissuaded a reasonable worker"
from making the complaint. Eight justices
joined the majority opinion, and Justice
Alito filed a separate concurring opinion.
Addressing the free-speech rights of
government workers, the court ruled 5 to 4
that the Constitution does not protect public
employees against retaliation for what they
say in the course of performing their
assigned duties.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in this
case, Garcetti v. Ceballos, No. 04-473, drew
a distinction between public employees'
official speech, which he said supervisors
were entitled to control, and their speech as
citizens contributing to "civic discourse," for
which they retained constitutional
protection. The dissenters were Justices
Stevens, Souter, Breyer and Ginsburg.
Abortion
The justices papered over, at least for this
term, their fundamental differences on
abortion, ruling narrowly and unanimously
in a case from New Hampshire on access to
abortion for teenagers facing medical
emergencies. In an opinion by Justice
O'Connor, her last before leaving the bench,
the court reaffirmed that a medical-
emergency exception was constitutionally
required in a law that placed obstacles, like a
parental-notice requirement and a waiting
period, in the path of teenagers seeking
abortions.
The more difficult question in the case,
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern
New England, No. 04-1144, was that of
what to do about New Hampshire's failure to
include such an exception in its parental
notice law. The justices sent the case back to
the federal appeals court in Boston, which
had banned enforcement of the law in its
entirety, even for teenagers not facing a
medical emergency.
That "most blunt remedy" would be justified,
Justice O'Connor said, only if it was clear
that New Hampshire's legislature, which
enacted the law in 2003, would have
preferred no law at all to one with the
necessary health exception. Otherwise, she
said, the appeals court should come up with
a more limited remedy for the constitutional
problem.
Patents
Indicating new interest in intellectual
property law, the justices considered several
patent cases but failed to offer much
guidance in this burgeoning legal area.
The court handed a limited victory to eBay
in its patent dispute with MercExchange,
which successfully sued eBay for patent
infringement on the method behind the
online auction company's "Buy It Now"
feature. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, which has sole
jurisdiction over patent appeals, then granted
an injunction against eBay's use of the
technology, under the view that an
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injunction should automatically follow a
finding of infringement.
In a unanimous opinion by Justice Thomas,
the justices instructed the appeals court to
make a case-by-case determination rather
than apply an automatic injunction rule. But
the opinion, eBay v. MercExchange, No. 05-
130, left it unclear what presumptions and
factors should go into that determination,
and it was evident that the justices
themselves had not agreed on a standard.
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"Five Justices to Watch as the Roberts Court Evolves
Roberts: New chief shows he'll be more forceful presence on bench"
USA Today
May 12, 2006
Joan Biskupic
The death of Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and the retirement of Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor make the current term
the first in 34 years in which the Supreme
Court gained two new members in a single
term. But the changes are more momentous
than in 1972, when Rehnquist and Lewis
Powell joined the court, for two reasons:
They involve the important post of chief
justice and the replacement of O'Connor, the
court's most influential member.
For more than a decade, the moderate
O'Connor was able to steer decisions,
sometimes toward the court's more liberal
members-John Paul Stevens, David Souter,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer-
and sometimes toward its conservatives:
Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas. Justice Anthony Kennedy often
was in the middle with O'Connor, but more
to the conservative side.
President Bush cited the conservative
credentials of new Chief Justice John
Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito when he
appointed them, but it isn't clear how they
will affect the nation's law. As Roberts and
Alito begin to define their roles, other
justices are redefining theirs. Five to watch:
Kennedy: From the Middle, an Emerging
Power Broker
Kennedy, 69, an appointee of President
Reagan, is positioned to be the lone justice
in the middle between four liberals and four
conservatives-and the high court's voice on
divisive issues.
In January, Kennedy wrote the court's
opinion that upheld Oregon's law on
physician-assisted suicide in the face of the
Bush administration's attempt to void it.
On April 3, Kennedy, joined by the
conservative Roberts and the liberal Stevens,
took the lead in explaining why they had
denied an appeal by terror suspect Jose
Padilla.
Kennedy is among five justices on the
current court-and the only one not in the
liberal wing-to have expressed support for
abortion rights, making him perhaps the
most important vote on the issue.
Early in his tenure he voted against such
rights, but he surprisingly reversed course in
a 1992 case and voted to uphold Roe v.
Wade, the 1973 ruling that made abortion
legal nationwide.
However, in a 2000 dis
that its critics call "p
Kennedy sided
conservatives in a di
said states should be
"abhorrent" procedure.
pute over a procedure
artial-birth" abortion,
with the court's
ssenting opinion that
able to outlaw the
A significant test of Kennedy's evolving
views will come this fall, when the high
court takes up a dispute over a federal ban
on the procedure.
Harvard University law professor Richard
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Fallon says that for years, he taught his
constitutional law classes with an eye
toward the writings of O'Connor, the author
of the court's standards on abortion rights,
affirmative action, separation of church and
state and several other contentious issues.
"Now, it's going to be Justice Kennedy right
in the center," Fallon says.
Roberts: New Chief Shows He'll Be
Forceful Presence on Bench
In seven months, the new chief justice, 51,
already is making a mark. On the bench he
has become known for vigorously asking
pointed questions-a stark contrast to the
plodding style of his predecessor, Rehnquist.
Roberts has written few opinions, but the
charm and preparedness that made him a star
litigator before he became a judge have
analysts predicting he could be a
conservative powerhouse-more effective
than Rehnquist and, before him, former
chief justice Warren Burger.
"These justices are used to being persuaded
by him," says Notre Dame University law
professor Richard Garnett, referring to
Roberts' having argued 39 cases before the
court as a lawyer for the government and in
private practice.
"He comes on as the 'rock star' Supreme
Court litigator," Garnett says. "And because
he is a great litigator, he knows how to find
the heart of the issue and focus the attention
of others on it."
Georgetown University law professor Peter
Rubin says there's a chance that Roberts'
conservative views could prompt a stronger
show of force from the court's liberals-and
further enhance the power of the vacillating
Kennedy.
Along with Scalia and Thomas, Roberts has
cast dissenting votes against Oregon's
assisted-suicide law and in favor of law
enforcement in a Georgia dispute over a
warrantless search of a home by police. In
March, Roberts led a unanimous ruling that
said the U.S. government can withhold
funds from universities that deny military
recruiters access in protest of the Pentagon's
policy on gays and lesbians.
"Nothing he has done so far should
disappoint conservatives," Fallon says.
Souter: Shy Justice Begins to Reveal Edge
Souter, 66, an appointee of the first
President Bush and one of the court's
liberals, has long been known for his
reserved manner. He has shed that persona
in recent court sessions and become more
hard-hitting.
During oral arguments in March in a case
that tests the administration's plan to hold
military tribunals for foreign terror suspects,
Souter angrily suggested that the White
House was trying to prevent the nation's
judges from ensuring that such suspects are
not wrongly jailed.
Earlier, Souter wrote a biting opinion for a
liberal-led majority that declared a police
search unconstitutional. In a break from his
usual collegiality, Souter derided dissenting
justices for opinions that he said gave short
shrift to privacy rights.
Souter usually does not draw attention to
himself. Off the bench, he is shy and rarely
gives public speeches or attends social
functions in Washington.
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"There is some evidence that Souter is going
to become a stronger voice than before,"
says Harvard University law professor
David Barron. He suggests that Roberts'
potential as a conservative force of nature
appears to be revving up the court's liberals,
particularly Souter and Stevens.
Alito: New Justice
Conservative Streak
Shows His
Alito, 56, joined the court as O'Connor's
replacement on Jan. 31. He has a reticent
demeanor and has written only one opinion.
It was a straightforward, unanimous decision
in a South Carolina criminal law dispute; all
of the other justices signed his opinion. A
key question from his Senate confirmation
hearings-whether he, unlike O'Connor, will
vote against abortion rights-won't be
answered until at least the 2006-07 term.
Alito's questions from the bench often have
been in sync with those of the conservative
Scalia-perhaps reinforcing the "Scalito"
nickname that Alito drew as a conservative
lower court judge. During a court session in
March, a lawyer arguing before the justices
referred to Alito as "Scalia" before quickly
correcting himself.
Stevens: Liberal Justice Remains
Formidable
At 86, the Ford appointee who is the most
senior member of the court's liberal wing
has shown few signs of slowing down, much
less retiring. This term, Stevens appears to
be vying with the new chief justice over the
court's direction, Barron says.
One sign of that, Barron says, came when
Stevens and Roberts joined Kennedy's
statement in the Padilla case. "Neither Chief
Justice Roberts nor Justice Stevens was
inclined to leave Kennedy out there with an
opinion that only one of the competing
leaders signed on to," Barron says. "There's
a strong interest among them, especially
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Stevens, in
commanding the court for their vision of the
Constitution. The really open question is:
Now that Justice O'Connor's voice is gone,
whose voice will the court become?"
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"The First Voting Statistics"
SCOTUSblog
June 28, 2006
Tom Goldstein
Every year, we publish a variety of statistics
on the Term. Our preliminary set of voting
statistics (subject to the effect of two
decisions tomorrow and double checking
generally) is now available here. Last
Term's numbers for comparison are
available here.
I did some preliminary and rough analysis of
the effect of the new Justices. I averaged the
Justices' voting relationships in the 2001
and 2005 Terms. Then I compared them
with this Term. The results were relatively
striking.
Chief Justice Roberts accomplished
something you wouldn't think possible in a
sometimes deeply divided court, at least for
someone who is not the "swing vote": he
was closer to every other Justice than his
predecessor. For three of the more liberal
Justices, the change was dramatic: Stevens,
+15%; Souter, +17%; Ginsburg, +17%. For
more conservative members of the Court,
the change tended to be smaller (though for
Scalia it was 12%).
Don't get confused into thinking that
Roberts gravitated towards the more liberal
Justices. Rehnquist's relationship with the
other conservatives was already very strong;
Roberts had little to do to establish a high
degree of affinity.
Instead, the data show that Roberts-
consciously or not, and more likely the
former-built bridges throughout the Court.
The numbers for Justice Alito were striking
as well, in a way that is encouraging for
conservatives, discouraging for progressives.
(Note that the sample size for Justice Alito is
smaller-only 36 cases-and therefore
potentially misleading, particularly because
he was handed three cases with 4-4 ties that
were originally argued when O'Connor was
on the Court, without any of the many
unanimous cases from that earlier period.)
Compared with Justice O'Connor, Alito's
affinity with all the conservatives grew
substantially: Scalia, +13%; Kennedy,
+15%; Thomas, +14%; and (though the
comparison is inexact) Roberts (compared to
O'Connor's affinity with Rehnquist) +12%.
By contrast, the affinity with the liberals was
lower, sometimes substantially: Stevens, -
15%; Souter, -5%; Ginsburg, -4%; Breyer, -
14%.
In case you want to look at the actual
numbers, they are available here.
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"The Case of Alito v. O'Connor"
The National Journal
January 7, 2006
Stuart Taylor, Jr.
Most analysts predict (and I agree) that if
confirmed, Judge Samuel Alito will be more
conservative than Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, whom he would succeed on the
Supreme Court. That's why O'Connor was
practically begged to stay on by liberal
Democratic senators such as Barbara Boxer
of California and Patrick Leahy of Vermont;
moderate Republican senators such as Arlen
Specter of Pennsylvania and Olympia
Snowe and Susan Collins of Maine; and
liberal groups such as the National
Organization for Women.
But amid the debate over Alito's writings
and decisions, some of the most telling signs
of a right-wing agenda have received too
little attention.
Affirmative action. The judge has
repeatedly blocked or crippled programs
designed to protect blacks against the
continuing effects of American apartheid.
One decision, which struck down a school
board's policy of considering race in layoff
decisions, thwarted an effort to keep a few
black teachers as role models for black
students. A second blocked a similar
program to shield recently hired black police
officers from layoffs. A third blocked a city
from opening opportunities for minority-
owned construction companies by striking
down its program to channel 30 percent of
public works funds to them.
Voting rights. Making it harder for black
and Hispanic candidates to overcome white
racial-bloc voting, the judge has repeatedly
struck down majority-black and majority-
Hispanic voting districts because of their
supposedly irregular shape. But the judge
saw no problem with the gerrymandering of
bizarrely shaped districts by Pennsylvania's
Republican-controlled Legislature to rig
elections against Democrats!
Civil rights and women's rights. Decision
after decision has made it harder for victims
of racial and gender discrimination to
vindicate their rights. One used a narrow
reading of Title IX, the federal law banning
gender discrimination by federally funded
schools and colleges, to block victims from
suing unless the federal money went to the
particular discriminatory program. A second
blocked victims of racial and other
discrimination from suing federally funded
programs and institutions unless they can
prove intent to discriminate-often an
impossible burden. A third barred victims of
rape and domestic violence from suing
under the federal Violence Against Women
Act.
Gay rights. One decision allowed states to
prosecute and brand gay people as criminals
for enjoying sexual relations, even in the
privacy of their own bedrooms. Another
supported a homophobic group's
discriminatory exclusion of gay boys and
men, citing the group's "freedom of
association."
Religion. The judge has often breached the
wall of separation between church and state.
Decisions boosting governmental subsidies
for Catholic and other religious schools
include one that supported "voucher"
programs condemned by teachers groups
and another that approved a state tax
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deduction for tuition paid to religious
schools. Other decisions have forced public
schools to open their doors to evangelical
Bible clubs; forced a state university to
subsidize a Christian student magazine;
allowed a state legislature to pay a chaplain
to open each day's session with a prayer; and
supported official displays of explicitly
Christian symbols, including a tax-funded
Christian nativity scene as part of a city's
holiday display.
States' rights-and guns. One decision
crippled enforcement of the Brady gun
control law by striking down its requirement
that local law enforcement officials perform
background checks on handgun purchasers.
A second struck down a federal law that
sought to protect children by barring
possession of guns in or near schools. A
third immunized states from suits under the
federal Fair Labor Standards Act, leaving
4.7 million state employees with no remedy.
Death penalty. The judge has been
relentless in pushing death-row inmates
toward execution chambers-even in the face
of eye-catching evidence of possible
innocence and systematic racial
discrimination. One decision expedited the
execution of a coal miner-whose guilt is
doubted by experts-because his lawyer had
missed a state court filing deadline by one
day. Two dissents supported executions of
16-year-olds and of defendants so insane
that they have no idea what they did.
Civil liberties. One decision gave a virtual
blank check for government investigators to
conduct aerial surveillance of citizens-even
by hovering over the fenced yards of private
homes. A second upheld the forfeiture of a
woman's car because her faithless husband
had been parked in it while receiving oral
sex from a prostitute. Two more gave
presidents absolute immunity and attorneys
general almost absolute immunity from
lawsuits for their official acts, including the
Nixon administration's illegal wiretapping of
political opponents. And the judge approved
a police officer's fatal shooting of an
unarmed, 15-year-old black youth, in the
back, because he was suspected of fleeing
the scene of a minor burglary.
Choice. The judge has called abortion
"morally repugnant"; declared Roe v. Wade
to be "on a collision course with itself';
claimed that governments have "compelling
interests in the protection of potential human
life ... throughout pregnancy"; and forced
terrified minors to notify often-abusive
parents (or beg judges for permission)
before they can obtain abortions.
Environment. Among other anti-
environment decisions, the judge overturned
a long-established Clean Water Act
regulation that had protected ponds and
many wetlands from dredging and filling by
profiteering developers.
Big business. One decision supported Big
Tobacco's position that it could not be
regulated in any way by the federal Food
and Drug Administration-not even to
prevent use of TV ads to hook children and
teenagers on cigarettes. A second overturned
a jury's $145 million award of punitive
damages against a big insurance company
that had refused in bad faith to settle a valid
car-crash claim and thereby exposed a
policyholder to personal liability.
I could go on. But as you've probably
figured out by now, I have been playing a
little trick. None of the opinions, dissents, or
votes described above (accurately if
incompletely) were Judge Alito's. All were
Justice O'Connor's.
That would be the same Sandra Day
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O'Connor who is hailed on the Web sites of
Alito's most bitter opponents as "moderate"
(Naral Pro-Choice America); as "a critical
vote ... in numerous cases to protect
Americans' rights and liberties" (People for
the American Way); and as "beholden to
nothing and to no one except the law"
(NOW).
My purpose has been to illustrate how easily
the tactics used by liberal groups to tar Alito
could be used to portray even the sainted,
moderate O'Connor as a fanatical
conservative who "has sought to dismantle
reproductive choice, undermine civil-rights
enforcement, weaken environmental
protections, restrict individuals' ability to
seek justice in the courts when their rights
are trampled by corporations, and diminish
constitutional protections for abusive
government intrusion into Americans'
privacy," to borrow from a recent People for
the American Way depiction of Alito.
I have, to be sure, taken certain liberties by
using loaded language and by selectively
omitting factual context and the many
O'Connor decisions and votes that could be
used to portray her as quite liberal.
But I have done no more slanting than many
liberal groups-and some journalists-have
done in their misleading campaign to
caricature Alito. And while I have failed
(until now) to mention that O'Connor has
drifted markedly toward the liberal side of
the spectrum over the past two decades,
Alito's critics have similarly ignored much
evidence that his 15 years of steady,
scholarly, precedent-respecting work as a
judge tell us more about him than a handful
of widely (and misleadingly) publicized
memos that he wrote more than 20 years
ago.
Not to mention the critics' efforts to drown
out the virtually unanimous praise voiced by
the many moderates and liberals (as well as
conservatives) who know Alito well:
colleagues (current and former), classmates,
friends, and former law clerks. Sure, they
say, Alito is a conservative. But he also
believes deeply that judges should be
constrained by established legal rules and
hard facts-and should not be looking to
promote political agendas. This helps
explain why the American Bar Association's
Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary
has unanimously rated Alito "well qualified"
for the Supreme Court-the highest possible
rating.
After reading hundreds of news articles and
interviewing dozens of people during the
nearly 10 weeks since Alito's nomination, I
have yet to come across a single suggestion
(even anonymous) by anyone well
acquainted with the man that he will bring a
radical conservative agenda to the Court. If I
have missed anyone out there, please let me
know.
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"How Scalia Lost His Mojo"
Slate Magazine
July 5, 2006
Conor Clarke
Last week, when Antonin Scalia found
himself on the losing end of Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld-the case invalidating the Bush
administration's military commissions for
Guantanamo detainees-the court's self-
styled littirateur did what he does best: He
blew his stack. The court's interpretation of
legislative history, he wrote, only makes
sense if it "indulges the fantasy that Senate
floor speeches are attended (like the
Philippics of Demosthenes) by throngs of
eager listeners, instead of being delivered
(like Demosthenes' practice sessions on the
beach) alone into a vast emptiness."
Two days earlier, when Justice David
Souter's dissent in a death-penalty case,
Kansas v. Marsh, rubbed Scalia the wrong
way (the court upheld a law Souter called
"morally absurd"), Scalia gave a similarly
scalding performance. Souter's opinion, he
wrote in a concurrence, "has nothing
substantial to support it" and makes a great
fuss about the largely irrelevant question of
wrongful conviction in the criminal justice
system. "That is a truism," Scalia snapped,
"not a revelation."
That scolding tone, those deliciously
overwrought metaphors: It's Catholic-school
headmistress meets Vladimir Nabokov, and
it's the lively, unapologetically stylish Scalia
that avid court-watchers know and love. But
the opinions above stand out this term, not
just for their colorful language and
questionable etiquette. Such decisions are
noteworthy because they have become
increasingly rare. The 2005 term might well
mark the demise of more than just Bush's
military commissions and mechanisms to
enforce the exclusionary rule: It could also
signal the decline of Antonin Scalia's literary
style.
Everyone agrees that Scalia is a witty jurist
and a lively writer. Earlier this year, the
New York Times crowned him the "funniest
justice" on the court, finding him
responsible for a whopping 77 "laughing
episodes" during oral arguments of the 2004
term-1 9 times the number of episodes
produced by Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
infinitely more than those produced by
Scalia's ideological neighbor Clarence
Thomas. Conservatives, meanwhile, can't
stop praising him for the brio he brings to
the bench. Web sites like Cult of Scalia and
Ninomania give fans the chance to wax
sycophantic about the "greatest jurist of our
time" and the "yummy" dissents he
produces. 2004 also saw the release of a
book, Scalia Dissents: Writings of the
Supreme Court's Wittiest, Most Outspoken
Justice-a fawning collection of opinions,
compiled by Kevin A. Ring. "Scalia's way
with words," writes a breathless Ring, "is
what makes this book possible."
Just what is this "way with words" that
makes Scalia so distinctive? His writing
style is best described as equal parts anger,
confidence, and pageantry. Scalia has a taste
for garish analogies and offbeat allusions-
often very funny ones-and he speaks in no
uncertain terms. He is highly accessible and
tries not to get bogged down in abstruse
legal jargon. But most of all, Scalia's
opinions read like they're about to catch fire
for pure outrage. He does not, in short, write
like a happy man.
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But there was a lot less of his trademark
style this year. And there's a very simple
reason to expect to see less of Scalia's verbal
pyrotechnics in the future: Scalia's angry wit
depends on having someone to criticize, and
criticism tends to travel by way of the
dissent. That's why Ring's book has the title
it does, instead of, say, Scalia Delivers or
Scalia Convinces Everyone That He's Right.
For 18 years, Scalia has been a frustrated
conservative presence on a shifting but
moderate bench, and it shows in his writing.
Yes, he has certainly produced a few
thrilling majority opinions, but Ring rightly
notes that "nearly every opinion reveals
Scalia's strong disagreement with the
reasoning, if not the conclusion, of a
majority of the Court."
As that court lurches rightward, though,
Scalia's contrarian spirit will begin to seem
less, well, contrarian. Already, he has been
dissenting less. Since Samuel Alito joined
him on the bench (for a total of about 40
cases this term), Scalia has joined or written
dissents just three times (with one partial
dissent). During the last 40 cases of the 2004
term, by contrast, Scalia dissented 11 times,
and twice in part.
Since the 2005 term began, Scalia has
written more majority opinions than any
other justice and has authored the third-
fewest dissents-a stark contrast with past
terms. The endlessly charming John Roberts
has made no secret of his desire for a court
that speaks with a unified voice, and as
Walter Dellinger pointed out last week, he
pulled off the astonishing mathematical trick
of agreeing with every justice on the court
more than Rehnquist had. Alito's charms are
less universal, but he agreed with Scalia 13
percent more than did Sandra Day
O'Connor-a justice with her own special
place in Nino's hell. With the court less
Balkanized, the vitriolic stylings of Scalia
will seem increasingly out of place.
This is not to claim that Scalia won't find a
place for a clever turn of phrase or a purple
metaphor in the future. His dissent in
Hamdan and opinion in Marsh prove there
is enough contested constitutional territory
still available, and I have no doubt that
Scalia's love of language transcends
ideological lines. (For years, he and Harry
Blackmun-as intellectually distant as two
justices could be-were the sole members of
the Chancellor's English Society, a playful
group Scalia founded to promote proper
English usage.) But it's simply in the nature
of dissents to spawn the kind of fuming
creativity that Scalia most loves. When you
dissent, not only do you have a nice big
target at which to take aim-the majority-but,
more important, you don't need anyone else
on the court to agree with you. "It is clearly
true," Georgetown law professor Peter
Rubin told me, "that any justice is freer to
write whatever he or she wants alone." In
short, it's easy for Scalia to be a big, colorful
jerk in dissents because he can be a big,
colorful jerk all by his lonesome self.
And how. A quick tour of Scalia's greatest
hits in dissent is in order. There's Morrison
v. Olson, in which the court upheld the
Independent Counsel Act. (Remember
Kenneth Starr?) Scalia, writing on the short
end of a 7-1 split, upbraided his colleagues
for overlooking an obvious separation-of-
powers problem. Some dangers come before
the court "in sheep's clothing," he wrote.
"But this one comes as a wolf." Then there's
PGA Tour, Inc., v. Martin, in which the
court had to decide whether a rule requiring
all golfers to "walk" the course violated the
rights of a disabled golfer. In dissent, Scalia
suggested that, "out of humility or out of
self-respect (one or the other) the Court
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should decline to answer this incredibly
difficult and incredibly silly question." And
few can forget Planned Parenthood v.
Casey-the 1992 case upholding the core
holding of Roe v. Wade-in which Scalia's
dissent achieved a level of frustrated fury
usually reserved for undersea volcanoes and
small dogs tied to parking meters.
Chastising the majority opinion's claim that
it is "tempting" to limit the freedom of
federal judges, he retorted that "no
government official is 'tempted' to place
restraints upon his own freedom of action,
which is why Lord Acton did not say 'Power
tends to purify.' "
It's heady stuff-and that's without even
getting into Scalia's jeremiads against the
use of international law, "evolving standards
of decency," or the court's embrace of the
"homosexual agenda." But in majority
opinions, the name of the game is coalition-
building, and while the Scalia who speaks in
the first person plural is able to find room
for a flash or two of wit, there's just no
comparison with his dissents. You can read
Scalia's majority opinions in Davis v.
Washington or United States v. Gonzalez-
Lopez, without cracking a smile, and-a line
or two notwithstanding-Scalia's majority
opinion in Hudson v. Michigan (which
allowed unconstitutionally acquired
evidence to be used at trial) could have been
written by pretty much anyone.
I don't doubt that all this newfound
relevance pleases Scalia. And he may well
try to have his cake and eat it too by writing
lots of blistering concurrences that take
shots at anyone and everyone within rifle
range. But that would be pointless. You
might even say it would be a bit like
Demosthenes on the beach, rattling off into a
big, open nothingness.
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"Term Analysis: A "Split-the-Difference" Court"
SCOTUSblog
July 5, 2006
Lyle Denniston
In the annual popular ritual of judging the
Supreme Court's Term, pundits and analysts
of various stripes have concluded-more or
less-that this has been a 4-1-4 Court, with
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy rising to new
eminence as "the decisive swing vote" in the
middle, essentially replacing Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor in that role. That, of course,
is an arguable position, but it does tend to
obscure the complexity of the voting
patterns and results as the Term unfolded.
While some commentators, appropriately,
have been tentative about drawing firm
conclusions until more is known about the
Court's two new members, there is a
discernible character to this new Court that
simultaneously goes beyond the simplistic
judgments about Kennedy and locates some
characteristics that may well endure as the
"Roberts Court" develops further.
That character may be summed up this way:
this is a "split-the-difference Court." The
idea, and the phrase, originate in the
persuasive perspective of J. Harvie
Wilkinson III, a judge on the Fourth Circuit
Court in Richmond (and one of the federal
judiciary's more thoughtful jurists). It is not
based on a review of the 2005-2006 Term,
but rather on judgments he makes about the
last five years of the "Rehnquist Court."
His essay, "The Rehnquist Court at Twilight:
The Lures and Perils of Split-the-Difference
Jurisprudence," appears in the Stanford Law
Review (58 Stanford Law Review 1969
[2006]). The text of the essay can be found
here. (Thanks to newspaper columnist
George Will for bringing this piece into
fuller public display. This post will not do
full justice to the piece; it needs to be read in
its entirety.)
Before overlaying this perspective on the
2005-2006 Term (that will come shortly),
Wilkinson's thesis needs to be summarized.
According to Judge Wilkinson: as the Court
entered the 21st Century, there was a
discernible shift in its approach. "The Court
sought to tackle the most controversial
issues before it by splitting the difference.
Few courts have ever raised this form of
jurisprudence to such an art form." It
involves splitting-the-difference in result, in
reasoning, and in the way a Court majority
adapts to "the polar positions" of national
debate about a key issue.
From several decisions that Wilkinson
analyzes, here are examples that illustrate
each of his categories: the Michigan
affirmative action decisions in 2003-
splitting-the-difference in result; the 2004
decision in the war-on-terrorism case,
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld-splitting-the-difference
in reasoning; and the gay sexual privacy
decision in 2003, Lawrence v. Texas-
splitting-the-difference on an issue of
national controversy.
As the judge sums up: "Splitting the
difference.. .enabled the Rehnquist Court in
the final years to craft narrow rulings that
reflected, by and large, the temper of the
times... Splitting the difference is above all
an act of compromise. If the wheels of
national life are often greased with
compromise, courts should not themselves
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shy away from seeking it."
Wilkinson, after recounting the positive side
of this approach, goes on to warn of its
perils. "Splitting the difference," he writes,
"allows democratic freedoms to be eroded
incrementally, especially since the
propelling force behind the Court's gradual
encroachments are the Court's own prior
pronouncements. Splitting constitutional
differences is . . . more likely to be grounded
in policy and wisdom. . . . This approach
involves the slow accretion of authority....
There is a thin line between the unabashedly
pragmatic exercise of splitting differences
and the practice of politics itself."
Using this thesis as a caliper to measure the
2005-2006 Term, one can get closer to what
the "Roberts Court" is-and what it is
becoming.
Take, as a beginning example, the one ruling
in the Term that stands above all others in
national importance: the war-on-terrorism
case, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, decided on the
final day of the Term. For all of its boldness
in confronting President Bush and his
notions of the "unitary Presidency," the
Hamdan decision decidedly splits the
difference-in result, in reasoning, and in
staying between "polar positions." The
Court did not reject the President's "inherent
authority" argument, but skipped over it; it
avoided confrontation with Congress over its
power to curb courts' jurisdiction; it relied
on Congress' authority in military justice as
controlling; and it eschewed international
law and relied instead on domestic statutory
command.
There is another war-on-terrorism result that
often gets overlooked, because it did not
involve a final decision: the Court's decision
in April not to hear the challenge by a U.S.
citizen, Jose Padilla, to his detention and
long-term confinement as an "enemy
combatant." But in declining to hear the
case, the Court split the difference between
embracing presidential power and having the
courts used by an Executive willing to shift
its handling of terrorism suspects when it
was about to lose ground in the courts.
Consider another, very important decision:
in the Texas congressional redistricting case.
The Court left open the theory that partisan
gerrymandering may go too far but did not
encourage further debate about it, it paid
tribute to legislative supremacy in this field
to displace judicial result, and it made
modest use of judicial authority to protect
minority voters.
In three high-profile cases on criminal law,
the Wilkinson perception holds: Hudson v.
Michigan, on the use of evidence gathered
after a violation of the police "knock-and-
announce" rule, Georgia v. Randolph, on the
scope of consent to a police search; and
House v. Bell, on the treatment of evidence
that may show a convicted individual was
innocent of the crime. In each, the Court
resisted the extremes that were asserted by
some of the Justices, and kept the outcome
somewhere near the middle of judicial
theory and practical outcome.
The pattern is the same in the Vermont
campaign finance cases, in the major ruling
on the Clean Water Act (Rapanos v. United
States), and in the surprisingly narrow ruling
on abortion rights in Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood.
Of course, in several of those actions, one
can readily see the key role of Justice
Kennedy-writing for a shifting majority, or
being the object of conspicuous effort to
hold or attract his vote. But the complexity
of the decisions suggests a dynamic of
difference-splitting involving a number of
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Justices, with a clear-and differing-majority
working to avoid extremes.
If splitting-the-difference is the dominant
judicial ethic in this Court, it may be the
result more often of necessity than of choice.
When there are such pronounced differences
in judicial philosophy within the Court, as
there clearly are, "massing the Court" for an
outcome necessarily involves reaching for
something that approximates the middle.
This puts a premium on a Justice or Justices
who might be capable of submerging
otherwise-strong personal philosophy in the
search for common ground, or perhaps the
least common denominator. Kennedy, of
course, is demonstrably capable of that, but
so is Justice John Paul Stevens and Justice
Stephen G. Breyer, and, now and then,
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and David H.
Souter. There are signs that Chief Justice
John G. Roberts, Jr., may be inclined in that
direction, too.
What might emerge, then, is an array on this
Court of looser coalitions-Stevens,
Ginsburg and Souter on the more liberal end
but not immovably so, Kennedy, Breyer and
the Chief Justice forming something of a
pragmatic middle, new Justice Samuel A.
Alito, Jr., drawn to the conservative side but
not totally ready to line up with the two
predictable occupants of that bloc, Justices
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.
That would be a less predictable Court. But,
perhaps, not a Court very much different
from the one that sat in the concluding years
of the Rehnquist era, as portrayed by Judge
Wilkinson.
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"His Hipness"
The New York Times
July 9, 2006
Linda Greenhouse
Writing in April for a unanimous Supreme
Court, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.
found that the police in Brigham City, Utah,
acted properly in entering a home without a
warrant after they peered through a window
and saw a fight in progress that had left one
man spitting blood.
"The role of a police officer includes
preventing violence and restoring order, not
simply rendering first aid to casualties," the
chief justice said, rejecting the argument that
the police should have waited until the
altercation ended more conclusively. "An
officer is not like a boxing (or hockey)
referee, poised to stop a bout only if it
becomes too one-sided," he explained.
The chief justice's sports imagery galvanized
the legal blogs. Some found his boxing
reference inapt. "The whole point of boxing
is fighting!" wrote a participant on the
Althouse blog, run by Ann Althouse, a law
professor at the University of Wisconsin.
Others took issue with the hockey reference.
"Given all the padding that hockey players
wear, being punched by an opponent hardly
is more significant than being hit by a
toddler," one said.
Finally, another writer took a step back and
observed that "this shows another side of
Roberts as a good writer: displaying some
wry humor and hipness."
It is no surprise that the new chief justice's
every vote is being tabulated and
scrutinized. But so is his every metaphor.
Beyond John Roberts the chief justice, what
has this first term revealed about John
Roberts the judge?
He wrote eight majority opinions, roughly
his fair share, given that there were 69
opinions to divide among the nine justices.
He also wrote three dissenting opinions and
two concurrences. While not a huge body of
work, it is enough to convey at least a
preliminary sense of his judicial voice.
It is direct, straightforward, free of legal
jargon, the voice of a lawyer who made a
living selling complicated ideas to busy
appellate judges under tight time constraints.
Prof. Erwin Chemerinsky of Duke
University Law School, who spent the past
week editing the term's cases for inclusion in
his constitutional law textbook, said that the
Roberts opinions were refreshingly easy to
edit compared with those of most other
justices. "His prose style is clear and easy to
follow," Professor Chemerinsky said. "He
tells you right in the first paragraph exactly
what the case is about."
Prof. Akhil Amar of Yale Law School
praised the Roberts style for "elegance and
economy" as well as for the "occasionally
snappy line" that could crystallize a case for
lay readers. He gave two examples. One was
a majority opinion that rejected the
government's application of federal narcotics
law to stop a Brazil-based religious group
from importing a hallucinogenic tea for use
in its rituals. "The government's argument
echoes the classic rejoinder of bureaucrats
throughout history: If I make an exception
for you, I'll have to make one for everybody,
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so no exceptions," the chief justice wrote.
The second was a majority opinion that
found that the state of Arkansas had denied
due process to a homeowner by seizing and
selling his house for nonpayment of property
taxes without taking reasonable steps to
notify him of his jeopardy. Referring to
Gary K. Jones, the homeowner, Chief
Justice Roberts wrote: "In response to the
returned form suggesting that Jones had not
received notice that he was about to lose his
property, the state did-nothing."
"That little dash is brilliant," Professor Amar
said. "Every ordinary citizen can understand
the frustration of dealing with government
stupidity."
Among legal academics, the Roberts opinion
that received by far the most attention was
the one rejecting a constitutional challenge
to the Solomon Amendment, under which
universities forfeit all federal grants if they
fail to open their doors to military recruiters.
A group of law schools argued that the
statute violated their rights to free speech
and association.
As the case reached the court, many law
professors who had supported the challenge
began to have second thoughts, fearful that
the First Amendment argument, if accepted,
would undermine many anti-discrimination
laws by permitting bigots to opt out in the
name of free association. Even liberals, or
perhaps especially liberals, were therefore
relieved by the chief justice's conclusion that
because the law regulated neither speech nor
association, but merely conduct, it raised no
First Amendment problem.
Jack Balkin, a professor at Yale Law School,
said on his blog that the chief justice's
opinion "was carefully and skillfully written
to make almost no new law." Professor
Balkin said the opinion made the case "look
easy by artfully dodging every interesting
constitutional law question in sight."
That raises the question of whether the chief
justice's performance conforms to his own
stated goal: to be a "minimalist" judge who
decides no more than necessary, an umpire
simply calling balls and strikes. The answer
is yes, and no.
"He's 'minimalist' in recognizing that the
court is an ongoing enterprise with
precedents and history and tradition," said
Frederick Schauer, a professor at the
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard.
"He is not coming in with a big new theory
or a big new perspective."
On the other hand, the chief justice joined
opinions by Justice Antonin Scalia in
environmental and criminal cases that
reached beyond the specific disputes at hand
to call long-settled assumptions into
question. And several of his opinions had a
rhetorical edge. "It is a sordid business, this
divvying us up by race," he wrote in dissent
from a decision that enforced the Voting
Rights Act to invalidate a Texas
Congressional district.
His seeming allergy to citing law review
articles, or any other sources outside the
body of the court's published opinions, is a
striking feature of the Roberts approach. "It's
as if the answers to all questions are already
there, completely internal to the court, to be
teased out of the existing cases," said David
Barron, a professor at Harvard Law School.
Chief Justice Roberts, a former managing
editor of the Harvard Law Review, has cited
only a single law review article, one written
by Judge Henry Friendly, for whom he
clerked on the federal appeals court in New
York. It was a tip of the hat in his first
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opinion.
Relying on precedent as the only source of
law is an approach with strengths and
weaknesses, Professor Barron said, noting
that on the one hand, precedent can be a
smokescreen, "a rhetorical device to hide the
inevitable policy making," while on the
other, "it has its own constraining effects,"
making a judge less likely to embrace
dramatic change in the status quo.
Whether John Roberts's first year is a good
predictor of his 10th, 20th or 30th is an open
question. According to a new study by the
political scientists Lee Epstein and Jeffrey
A. Segal, Chief Justice Earl Warren voted
against criminal defendants and civil rights
litigants 62 percent of the time during his
first term. Eventually, of course, he became
their champion.
But such a trajectory is rare. The other chief
justices of the last 50 years, Fred M. Vinson,
Warren E. Burger and William H.
Rehnquist-Chief Justice Roberts's mentor-
all stayed true to their early form.
143
"Disorder in the Court:
The Guantanamo decision revealed a vein of deep passion on the Supreme Court. Which is
just what Chief Justice Roberts hoped for."
Time
July 10, 2006
Jeffrey Rosen
Ordinarily the Supreme Court is not very
much like The View. You won't hear much
of the Justices' inner thoughts, let alone their
outer ones. And with the exception of
perhaps the Dalai Lama or, in his day, Alan
Greenspan, they are the only people in
power who can deliver their opinions and
then steadfastly refuse to elaborate on them.
Everything about the court's rituals is meant
to keep the Justices behind the red velvet
curtains and their emotions in check.
The first year of the Supreme Court under
John Roberts, though, has not been ordinary.
As evidenced last week when the court
struck down the Bush Administration's use
of military tribunals, the Justices are
suddenly unafraid to talk to one another in
personal terms. "We are not engaged in a
traditional battle with a nation-state, but with
a worldwide, hydra-headed enemy," wrote
Clarence Thomas in an impassioned dissent.
Thomas felt so strongly-he called the
majority decision "unprecedented and
dangerous"-that for the first time in his 15
years on the court, he read his dissent aloud.
The ordinarily genial Stephen Breyer
responded indignantly that the court did not
"weaken our Nation's ability to deal with
danger." Congress, he added, "has not issued
the Executive a 'blank check."'
The pointed back and forth was
characteristic of the sometimes barbed, often
unpredictable and really quite fun Roberts
court. It began with a surprising number of
unanimous decisions, but by the time it
adjourned for the summer last week, in what
Justice John Paul Stevens called a
"cacophony" of discordant voices, the usual
decorous costume drama that is a Supreme
Court term had morphed into something
much closer-in vitriol, tension and drama-to
a soap opera (O.K., a PBS soap opera).
Having spent 11 years without a change in
personnel, the Justices were clearly
rejuvenated by two new colleagues, Roberts
and Samuel Alito, and the energy fueled
their opinions. Although the alliances on the
Roberts court are still fluid, even the
longest-serving Justices are debating issues
that matter to the American people-the
limits of death penalty, the war on
terrorism-with unusual passion.
Despite the impression left by its rush of
final decisions, the Roberts court is, at least
so far, less fractured than the court led for 19
years by William Rehnquist. Almost half its
decisions this year had no dissents,
compared with 38% in Rehnquist's final
term, and the tally of 16 cases decided by a
5-to-4 vote is seven fewer than under
Rehnquist. That is a tribute to the
personality and leadership skills of Roberts,
who has made issuing strong decisions and
encouraging collegial debate top priorities.
In a commencement speech at Georgetown
University Law Center in May, Roberts
opened with some high-quality lawyer jokes,
then set out his goals as Chief Justice:
unanimity or near unanimity, which he
thought would promote "clarity and
guidance for lawyers and lower courts trying
144
to figure out what Justices meant."
Roberts emphasized that a good court should
decide cases narrowly so Justices on both
sides can reach a meaningful consensus. But
he added an important qualifier: "There will
of course be disagreements on the court, and
these could and should not be artificially
suppressed." Roberts practiced what he
preached in his three dissents, using often
forceful prose. "It is a sordid business, this
divvying us up by race," he declared last
week in the partisan-gerrymandering case,
which left all but one of Texas' redrawn
congressional districts in place. Earlier in the
term, he attacked an opinion by Justice
David Souter that held that a wife couldn't
give the police permission to search a house
over her husband's objection. "The majority
reminds us, in high tones, that a man's home
is his castle," Roberts wrote, "but even under
the majority's rule, it is not his castle if he
happens to be absent, asleep in the keep, or
otherwise engaged when the constable
arrives at the gate."
Souter responded in kind. "In the dissent's
view, the centuries of special protection for
the privacy of the home are over," he
announced with an uncharacteristic note of
melodrama. Having abandoned his famous
Yankee reserve, he started to make a habit of
it. During oral arguments in the Gitmo case,
the government's lawyer seemed to suggest
that Congress could suspend the writ of
habeas corpus-which allows prisoners to
challenge the legality of their detentions-
inadvertently. Souter, incredulous, asked,
"Isn't there a pretty good argument that a
suspension of the writ [by] Congress is just
about the most stupendously significant act
that the Congress of the United States can
take? The writ is the writ!" Antonin Scalia,
one of the most reliable defenders of
Executive power, insisted that Congress
could suspend habeas corpus even if it didn't
say so explicitly.
That mini courtroom brawl between Souter
and Scalia, which had the overtones of an
18th century boxing match, was picked up
again in the final days of the term. By a 5-to-
4 vote, the court upheld a death-penalty
verdict in Kansas, and Souter filed an
agonized dissent listing recent cases in
which DNA testing had led to innocent
people's exoneration. Dripping with sarcasm,
Scalia chided Souter for encouraging the
"sanctimonious criticism of America's death
penalty" that he said was common in "some
parts of the world." "I say sanctimonious,"
Scalia added, "because most of the countries
to which these finger waggers belong had
the death penalty themselves until recently."
Scalia is famous for picking intellectual
street fights on and off the court, and this
year he has been even more pugnacious than
usual. In March, Scalia ridiculed the
challenge to military tribunals during a
speech in Switzerland. "Give me a break,"
he declared. "I had a son on that battlefield,
and they were shooting at my son, and I'm
not about to give this man who was captured
in a war a full jury trial. I mean, it's crazy."
A few weeks later, when a Boston reporter
asked whether his participation at a Mass for
Catholic lawyers might raise questions about
his impartiality, Scalia fanned the fingers of
his right hand under his chin. "That's
Sicilian," he said, explaining that the gesture
meant he "could not care less."
Scalia can always be counted on to pick a
fight, but what has changed this year is that
other Justices, once relative wallflowers, are
increasingly emboldened to fire back in
kind. In February, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
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ordinarily a model of judicial composure,
gave a speech in South Africa attacking
critics in Congress who have assailed her
citations of international law as an offense
against U.S. sovereignty. Those criticisms,
she said, "fuel the irrational fringe" and have
encouraged threats on her life. She singled
out Scalia, who had called the consultation
of "alien law" a form of "sophistry."
Is the recent round of attacks and
counterattacks a sign of internal animosity?
Not necessarily. Ginsburg and Scalia, after
all, are old friends, united by their love of
opera and good cooking. For years they have
spent New Year's Eve together, along with
their spouses. (Ginsburg's husband Marty
often cooks.) Certainly, there's nothing on
the Roberts court resembling the antagonism
among the Justices that raged after World
War II. Consider the blood feud between
Hugo Black and Robert Jackson, both
appointed by Franklin Roosevelt. Jackson
thought F.D.R. had promised to promote
him to Chief Justice, but after a vacancy
arose in 1946, Black threatened to resign if
Jackson became Chief. That led Jackson to
fire off an unhinged letter to President Harry
Truman and Congress, accusing Black of
unethical behavior. The '40s produced
another nasty rivalry: Felix Frankfurter was
so intellectually condescending to Chief
Justice Fred Vinson that during one of the
Justices' private conferences, Vinson rose
from his seat and nearly punched
Frankfurter in the nose. After Vinson died
unexpectedly of a heart attack while the
court was deciding Brown v. Board of
Education in 1953, Frankfurter declared on
the train back from the funeral, "This is the
first indication I have ever had that there is a
God."
By contrast, the Justices of the Roberts court
are able to attack one another vigorously in
public while maintaining cordial relations in
private. Thomas, for example, has told
students groups that he has never heard an
uncivil word uttered at the Justices'
conferences during his time on the court.
And despite the disagreement in the
military-tribunals case, Thomas is on good
terms with his ideological opponent Breyer,
who has praised Thomas' skills as a lawyer
and photographic memory in technically
complicated cases.
It's a good thing for the court and the
country that the Justices of the Roberts court
seem to be finding a way to disagree
vigorously without taking it too personally.
During his confirmation hearings, Roberts
said, "It's my job to call balls and strikes and
not to pitch or bat." Nevertheless, the court
under his leadership will continue to decide
some of the most momentous questions of
American life. It has already agreed to hear
important cases next term on the boundaries
of affirmative action and abortion. Those are
questions about which all the Justices have
extremely strong views, and the fact that
they are not shy about expressing them helps
citizens on both sides of the issues feel as
though their own views have been strongly
represented and thoroughly aired.
Still, the Roberts court is walking a delicate
line. History suggests that the moment the
Justices begin to take their legal
disagreements too much to heart, the court
may fracture in ways that even the most
capable Chief Justices are unable to repair.
For that reason, all the Justices might do
well to remember Ginsburg's advice for
keeping your cool in the face of attacks. "I
sometimes find myself alone in chambers
momentarily distressed or annoyed,"
Ginsburg told actress Marlo Thomas in 2002
"thinking, I'd like to strangle Justice So-and-
So." At times like that, Ginsburg said, she
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remembers the advice of her mother-in-law
on her wedding day: "Of course, it is
important to be a good listener-but it also
pays, sometimes, to be a little deaf."
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"How John Roberts Might Change the Law"
The National Journal
September 3, 2005
Stuart Taylor, Jr.
The more-provocative labels hurled at John
Roberts by the dozens of liberal groups
opposing his nomination seem unlikely to
stick, especially once the nation gets to
know him through his televised confirmation
testimony after Labor Day.
"Extreme"? This may be the most likable,
even-tempered, moderate-spirited nominee
in recent memory. True, the more than
60,000 pages of now-public Roberts
documents show him to be (or, at least, to
have been) a committed legal and political
conservative and a trenchant critic of many
Supreme Court precedents beloved by
liberals. But he has consistently rested his
arguments on powerful legal analyses and
on the highly defensible premise that the
Court should not "view itself as ultimately
responsible for governing all aspects of our
society," as he put it in a 1983 memo.
"Ideologue"? Roberts has won the personal
esteem of many liberals as well as
conservatives. He hardly appears to be a
man on a Bork-style mission to topple
decades of precedent or revolutionize the
law. While usually on the conservative side,
he has also argued forcefully for a pro-
environment client, for native Hawaiians
seeking racial preferences, and for poor
plaintiffs in a welfare-rights case. (Not to
mention his minor but telling assistance in a
big gay-rights case.)
"Out of step with ordinary Americans"?
Most (or at least many) of the views
championed by Roberts as a fast-rising
young lawyer in the Reagan and first Bush
administrations are more in step with those
of ordinary Americans than are the views of
his critics.
Still, there is a large kernel of truth in the
hundreds of pages of reports by liberal
groups about what Roberts had to say during
his years as a special assistant in the Justice
Department (1981-82), an assistant White
House counsel (1982-86), and deputy
solicitor general (1989-92).
Unless he has changed his mind about a lot
of things-which seems unlikely, although he
has shed some youthful cocksureness over
the years-Roberts may well tip the Court's
precarious balance perceptibly to the right
on some big issues. Especially those on
which the swing-voting Sandra Day
O'Connor has sided with the Court's four
liberals.
For better or worse, that could change the
law-perhaps dramatically, if one of the
liberals, such as 85-year-old John Paul
Stevens, steps down. Whether such a change
would be to your liking depends on whether
you would prefer that the Court remain to
the left of public opinion on most big issues,
which is where it has been for at least the
past 50 years and where most law professors
and journalists would like it to stay.
The Roberts documents show him to have
been a Reagan Republican with a deeply felt
conviction that judges should stop (or be
prevented from) invading the province of
elected officials in the guise of constitutional
interpretation. He touched on the same
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theme this summer in his response to a
Senate Judiciary Committee questionnaire,
asserting that judges "do not have a
commission to solve society's problems" and
should practice "institutional and personal
modesty and humility."
Roberts also bowed to the need to respect
precedent, which, he said, "plays an
important role in promoting the stability of
the legal system." But the principle of
modesty in the exercise of judicial power
will clash with respect for precedent in every
case in which the relevant precedent strikes
Roberts as an immodest intrusion into the
legislative or judicial realm. There may be
many such cases. Even Roberts himself
probably does not know how he will resolve
them. But here are some predictions as to
how he might differ from O'Connor:
Abortion. Roberts may be in a position to
move the Court by next June toward
upholding greater legislative restrictions on
abortion than O'Connor has allowed,
although no case involving a broad attack on
the basic abortion right created by Roe v.
Wade is on the horizon.
On November 30, the justices will hear a
challenge to a New Hampshire law requiring
parental notification (or judicial approval)
before minors can be given abortions. They
will also be asked in the coming months to
review a so-far-successful challenge to the
2003 congressional ban on "partial-birth"
abortion. Lower courts have held both laws
unconstitutional on their face because
(among other things) they lack explicit
exceptions for abortions deemed by doctors
to be necessary to protect the woman's
physical or emotional health.
O'Connor would probably have been the
fifth vote to strike down both laws, based on
her vote in 2000 to void a Nebraska "partial-
birth" abortion law with no health exception.
Roberts might well become the fifth vote to
uphold both laws, and possibly even to
overturn the 2000 decision.
Roberts famously helped prepare a 1990
Supreme Court brief restating (in a footnote)
the first Bush administration's view that
"Roe was wrongly decided and should be
overruled." He has cautioned against
assuming that this was or is his personal
view. Fair enough-especially as to the
"should be overruled" part, and especially
after 15 years during which six of the
current justices (including O'Connor) have
repeatedly reaffirmed Roe. Indeed, in
seeking his current job as a judge of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit two years ago, Roberts
testified that Roe was "the settled law of the
land."
But it's hard to imagine Roberts differing
from the consensus of conservative legal
experts-as well as many moderates and even
some liberals-that Roe had little or no basis
in the Constitution and should at least be
construed narrowly, if not overturned.
Racial preferences. In 2003, in a 5-4
decision upholding the racial preferences in
admissions at the University of Michigan
Law School, O'Connor moved the Court
toward greater acceptance of affirmative-
action preferences than ever before, at least
in education and perhaps also in
employment and contracting.
Roberts may move the Court in the opposite
direction. The memos and briefs he wrote
while in government exude dislike of
"quotas" and other racial preferences, and of
using the Voting Rights Act to require race-
based election districts.
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On the other hand, it would be surprising to
see Roberts translate his policy objections
into a broad-based constitutional ban on
racial preferences. That would be a most
immodest exercise of judicial power,
junking not only the 2003 precedent but also
the considered judgments of Congress, the
military, most states, and almost all
universities that preferences are sometimes
necessary to promote diversity.
Sex discrimination. O'Connor has usually
sided with plaintiffs and feminist groups in
sex-discrimination lawsuits and has tilted the
Court toward a broad view of Title IX.
That's the 1972 federal law that courts have
used to require colleges receiving federal
money to equalize female and male athletic
opportunities-even when that means ending
dozens of wrestling programs around the
country.
Roberts has been more skeptical of the use
of lawsuits and federal regulations to
promote equal opportunity, as his opponents
have stressed. This could make a difference
in more than a few cases. In 1999, for
example, O'Connor wrote a 5-4 decision
allowing lawsuits against federally funded
schools and universities for "deliberate
indifference" to the need to protect against
student-on-student sexual harassment.
Roberts might well have sided with the
dissenters, who warned of a "flood of
liability" potentially "crushing" school
districts and soaking local taxpayers.
Religion. O'Connor was the fifth vote in
both the June 27 decision ordering removal
of certain Ten Commandments displays
from courthouses and a 1992 decision
holding unconstitutional a brief,
nondenominational prayer at a public school
graduation. Roberts might have tipped the
balance the other way in both cases. In 1985,
he faulted the Court for "hostility to
religion" and assailed as "indefensible" a
decision striking down an Alabama moment-
of-silence law. And as deputy solicitor
general, he defended the graduation prayer
as noncoercive and constitutionally
innocuous.
Presidential power. President Bush has
claimed virtually unlimited powers to detain
and interrogate suspected "enemy
combatants" indefinitely with no semblance
of due process, and to try them in Bush-
created military tribunals that critics call
kangaroo courts. His detention policies
brought Bush two sharp rebuffs from the
Court in June 2004, with O'Connor in the
majority. Roberts, on the other hand, took a
broad view of executive power in a July 15
decision upholding the legality of Bush's
military tribunals. The opinion, which
Roberts joined but did not write, was rather
cavalier in dismissing the most cogent points
raised by the defense lawyers.
Does this opinion foreshadow a blank-check
approach that could facilitate creeping
presidential autocracy? That is probably the
most important of all the questions for
senators to explore when Roberts testifies.
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JUSTICE KENNEDY'S ROLE
"Kennedy Reigns Supreme on Court"
The Washington Post
July 2, 2006
Charles Lane
It was the O'Connor court. Now it may be
the Kennedy court.
The Supreme Court's just-concluded 2005-
2006 term was a historic one, in which two
new justices, Chief Justice John G. Roberts
Jr. and Samuel A. Alito Jr., changed the
court's style and ideological balance.
But by the end of the term, it was clear that
the main impact of the turnover was to
enhance the influence of a justice who has
been at the court since 1988, 69-year-old
Anthony M. Kennedy.
With the departure of centrist Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, the court is now frequently
split between two four-justice liberal and
conservative blocs, with Kennedy as the sole
remaining swing voter.
An eclectic and sometimes inscrutable
moderate conservative, Kennedy repeatedly
cast the decisive vote on the most polarizing
issues the court faced, from President Bush's
military commissions, to the Clean Water
Act, to the death penalty. He is poised to do
so again next term when the court takes up
the issues of abortion and school integration.
"Justice Kennedy seems to be asserting
himself more and seems to be relishing the
role," said Richard Lazarus, a law professor
at Georgetown University who heads the
school's Supreme Court Institute. "All the
justices enjoy being more significant rather
than less significant, and he has certainly
asserted his role as a moderating force on
both sides."
In the 17 cases during the 2005-2006 term
that were decided by five-vote majorities,
Kennedy was on the winning side 12 times,
more than any other justice, according to
figures compiled by the Supreme Court
Institute.
In six of those cases, Kennedy voted with
the conservative bloc, made up of Roberts,
Alito, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.
As a result, the court upheld most of Texas's
Republican-drafted redistricting plan,
restored the death penalty in Kansas, and
ruled that police do not have to throw out
evidence they gather in illegal no-knock
searches.
But four times, Kennedy, a 1988 appointee
of President Ronald Reagan, defected to the
liberal justices, John Paul Stevens, David H.
Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen
G. Breyer.
As a result, the court not only struck down
Bush's military commissions, but also ruled
that the police need permission from both
occupants to search a home without a
warrant, gave a Tennessee death row inmate
a chance to win a new trial, and said that
Texas violated the Voting Rights Act by
diluting the voting power of Latino
Democrats in one district. (Twice Kennedy
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was part of mixed left-right coalitions.)
Roberts voted in 10 five-justice majorities,
the second-most on the court, but he joined
the four liberals only once, in a minor
procedural case.
The "swing voter" role is not entirely new to
Kennedy, who has been in that position
before, along with O'Connor.
Indeed, Kennedy is disliked by many
conservatives because he has voted with
liberals to uphold gay rights and abortion
rights, and to strike down the juvenile death
penalty.
But since O'Connor retired from the court
Jan. 31, and Alito, who replaced her, has
lived up to his conservative billing, Kennedy
has been all alone as the swing voter-with
the added clout, and added pressure, that
implies.
O'Connor used to tell audiences that, at the
court, "we decide what cases to hear, and
then we decide 'em." Though she often ruled
only narrowly, she did not agonize.
Kennedy, by contrast, has been known to
brood or to switch his vote in the middle of a
case-though he is more inclined than
O'Connor was to rule broadly once he comes
to a conclusion. He is a passionate free-
speech advocate, and has a consistent record
of opposing affirmative action.
While O'Connor saw herself as a fact-
oriented problem-solver, Lazarus says,
Kennedy "views himself as a major
intellectual force."
More than some other justices, "Kennedy
sees real values in conflict in the court's
cases, and it's a question how you negotiate
it," said Neil Siegel, who served as a
Supreme Court law clerk in the 2003-2004
term and now teaches at Duke University's
law school. "Sometimes he does it well and
skillfully, and sometimes he just can't make
up his mind and the legal system gets stuck
in a kind of vertigo."
In the military commission case, Kennedy
ruled unequivocally, joining almost all of
Stevens's broad opinion. His few
reservations came in a concurring opinion
that also contained Kennedy's admonition
that "concentration of power puts personal
liberty in peril of arbitrary action by
officials."
But at other times this term, Kennedy cut
difficult issues very fine, drawing criticism
from his colleagues.
In a key case on the scope of the Clean
Water Act, Kennedy refused to join either
the conservatives, who voted as a bloc to
scale back federal power to regulate
wetlands, or the liberals, who wanted to
leave it intact.
Kennedy instead wrote a long opinion of his
own. He agreed with the conservatives that a
lower court had mistakenly allowed the
federal government to block development on
two Michigan properties, but disagreed with
them about why. He said the lower court
should reconsider the issue under a new
legal test-one that most analysts thought
would end up producing the same result the
liberals wanted anyway.
Kennedy's opinion would not change
wetlands protection in the long run, Stevens
wrote in a dissenting opinion joined by the
three other liberals, but "will have the effect
of creating additional work for all concerned
parties."
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Scalia, joined by the three conservatives,
called Kennedy's proposal "perfectly
opaque."
"He is a man in the middle, and the man in
the middle is fully capable of causing
muddle," said Douglas A. Kmiec, a
Pepperdine University law professor.
The pressure on Kennedy could mount next
term, when the court will rule on the
constitutionality of a federal law banning the
procedure opponents call "partial birth"
abortion, and will decide whether local
governments may consider students' race
when assigning them to public schools.
Though Kennedy is on record in favor of
Roe v. Wade, the 1973 decision that
recognized a right to abortion, he dissented
angrily from a 5 to 4 ruling in 2000 that
struck down a state law banning partial-birth
abortion.
That would seem to commit him to
upholding the federal ban, legal analysts
said, except that the 2000 case is binding
precedent and Kennedy may "be acutely
aware of a mere personnel change on the
court causing a radical shift," Siegel said.
Kennedy has always voted against
affirmative action, most recently in 2003
when he voted against race-conscious
admissions policies at the University of
Michigan's law school and undergraduate
program.
But the cases the court has agreed to hear
next term involve compulsory public
education for students as young as
kindergarten age. They also present the
problem of how public schools can avoid
resegregation, at a time when residential
segregation persists and court-ordered
school desegregation is largely a thing of the
past.
Under the circumstances, legal analysts do
not all agree that Kennedy necessarily
relishes his situation.
"I'm not certain it's an enviable position to
be in," Siegel said. "It's quite a burden to
bear."
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"Swing Time"
Slate Magazine
January 17, 2006
Dahlia Lithwick
Lost in last week's cacophony about the
critical role of Sandra Day O'Connor as sole
and exclusive swing voter on the U.S.
Supreme Court was any sign of respect for
the other sole and exclusive swing voter on
the U.S. Supreme Court: Anthony M.
Kennedy. And in case anyone else missed
this subtle shift in power, Kennedy's
majority opinion in today's big physician-
assisted-suicide case serves as the perfect
reminder of who's going to call the shots in
the near future.
The 6-3 opinion in Gonzales v. Oregon-a
decision upholding Oregon's physician-
assisted-suicide law from attack by the
Attorney General's Office-sharply outlines
the court's Anthony Kennedy-shaped future.
The dissenters are Antonin Scalia, Clarence
Thomas, and-not surprisingly-Chief Justice
John Roberts. In the majority you'll find the
court's usual moderate-to-liberal lineup:
John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
David Souter, and Stephen Breyer. The
other two votes for Oregon thus come from
the swingers: O'Connor, who will (barring
some stunning revelation that he dances for
money in women's lingerie) soon be
replaced by Samuel Alito, and Kennedy. In
other words, this opinion was Kennedy's
latest big chance to swing for the bleachers,
and swing he does.
While it's true that O'Connor has tended to
vote with the majority more frequently than
Kennedy, and that she has done so in some
big 5-4 decisions, it's also true that in other
extremely contentious areas, it is Kennedy,
not O'Connor, who has swung the court
leftward. It was Kennedy who weighed in
with the broad rationale of the court's
liberals on a key gay-rights case; Kennedy
who voted with the court's liberals to strike
down the death penalty for juveniles and the
mentally disabled; and Kennedy who has
joined with O'Connor (and David Souter) to
reaffirm the basic right of a woman to have
an abortion. Kennedy also offended the
political right when he authored a key
opinion prohibiting sectarian prayer at a
public-school graduation. And last term saw
Kennedy voting-against O'Connor and with
the court's liberals-on major cases giving
local governments permission to seize
private property in the interest of economic
development and denying states the right to
trump federal medical-marijuana laws.
It's Kennedy who was labeled by the right as
the most dangerous man in America, and
Kennedy whose name is most often
associated with the word impeachment.
Kennedy uniquely engenders hysteria, in
part because of his tendency to think grandly
and write sweepingly. O'Connor's case-by-
case approach allows the right to loathe her
on a case-by-case basis. But Kennedy's
tendency to tilt the whole universe on its
axis with a stroke of the pen sends his
enemies into orbit. The entire English lit
department at Yale would be hard-pressed,
for example, to deconstruct Kennedy's Big
Rights language in the gay-rights case,
which banned the states from outlawing
sodomy. It was Kennedy, not William
Brennan, who penned the sentiment in that
opinion:
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"Times can blind us to certain truths and
later generations can see that laws once
thought necessary and proper in fact serve
only to oppress. As the Constitution endures,
persons in every generation can invoke its
principles in their own search for greater
freedom."
Today's opinion in Gonzales includes few of
the usual Kennedy-esque linguistic
aeronautics. But that's probably because it
deals not with rights but with the mundane
world of statutory interpretation.
Jeffrey Toobin at The New Yorker recently
explained why Kennedy sometimes parts
company with his buddies on the court's
hard right wing. Of the court's conservatives,
only he has an abiding affection for all
things foreign, including-to the intense
chagrin of some of his colleagues-foreign
law. Kennedy's pragmatic reason for citing
to foreign courts as a means of fostering
worldwide legal respect is a part of his
rather grand vision for the lofty role of the
Supreme Court in government. He is
invariably parodied as the court's great white
agonizer; when pondering a vote in a case,
he is said to walk the court's ramparts for
hours, like an extremely tall Hamlet. For
better or worse, he takes the reputation of
the court extremely seriously, both in the
eyes of the world and the nation.
But another key to understanding Kennedy's
role as a swing voter is simpler: He just
really, really likes the power. In his book
Closed Chambers, Edward Lazarus, a former
clerk for Justice Harry Blackmun, writes that
Kennedy bragged about his ability to occupy
one of the pivotal positions on the court,
deliberately and craftily espousing views at
conference that would make him a necessary
but distinctive fifth vote for a majority. Like
O'Connor, Kennedy may be a legal
politician before he is an ideological purist.
And with O'Connor soon to be out of the
picture, Kennedy may now get the chance to
really make some constitutional hay.
All of which raises another question now
bandied about by hard-core court-watchers:
What will happen when the good-natured
and temperate Chief Justice Roberts begins
to work his twinkly charm on Kennedy? Is it
possible that while Scalia's insults helped
push the conservative Kennedy toward the
left, the tractor beam of Roberts' niceness
may pull him back into the fold? That's
certainly the hope of the political right. But
if today's opinion in Gonzales is a harbinger
of things to come, Roberts has some fairly
heavy-duty twinkling ahead of him.
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"Kennedy Moves Front and Center"
Los Angeles Times
July 2, 2006
David G. Savage
John G. Roberts Jr. may be the new chief
justice, but the Supreme Court is not truly
the Roberts court, at least not yet.
In the most divisive cases before the court in
the term that just ended, it was Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy who determined the
outcome every time. In unpredictable
fashion, he sided some of the time with the
court's conservative bloc and some of the
time with its liberals.
His influence was dramatically displayed
Thursday, when the court announced that it
had struck down President Bush's specially
created military tribunals for suspected
terrorists.
As Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas read their dissenting opinions in
court that day, Roberts and Samuel A. Alito
Jr., Bush's other new appointee, could do no
more than listen in agreement.
It was 86-year-old John Paul Stevens, the
court's last World War II veteran, who read
the 5-3 majority opinion. He solemnly
declared that the president was "bound to
comply with the rule of law" and that he
could not ignore congressional mandates and
long-standing U.S military rules.
He paused to note that Kennedy, seated next
to him, had joined most of his opinion,
creating a majority. Liberals hailed the
result, and conservatives lamented it.
While the issue before the court was the
balance of power in government, the drama
showed how little the balance of power
within the high court itself had changed.
Even when Roberts and Alito side with
fellow conservatives Scalia and Thomas,
they need a fifth vote to prevail.
For the last decade, Justices Kennedy and
Sandra Day O'Connor, both Ronald Reagan
appointees, had supplied the votes that
decided the court's major cases. They
usually joined with the conservatives on
issues of crime, the death penalty, civil
rights and states' rights, but with the liberals
on abortion, gay rights and school prayer.
Now, with O'Connor in retirement, Kennedy
stands alone at the center.
He voted with the conservatives more often
than not, but joined the liberals in several
major rulings. In one closely watched
environmental case, Kennedy wrote a
separate, solo opinion that was decisive.
On the issue of military tribunals, Kennedy
made it clear that he shared the liberals'
concern about unchecked presidential
power.
The Constitution created "a system where
the single power of the executive is
checked," he wrote. Even in a national
emergency, he said, "the Constitution is best
preserved by a reliance on standards tested
over time and insulated from the pressure of
the moment."
This does not mean that suspected terrorists
cannot be tried in military tribunals,
Kennedy said-but that Congress should first
debate the issue and pass a law.
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Kennedy is hardly in the camp of the
liberals. Just the day before, he spoke for a
five-member majority that upheld the mid-
decade redistricting plan engineered by
former House Majority Leader Tom DeLay
for Texas' seats in the U.S. House of
Representatives.
The four liberals, led by Stevens, say
"partisan gerrymandering" is
unconstitutional. The conservatives, led by
Scalia, counter that politics inevitably plays
a role in the drawing of electoral districts
and that there is no fair way to decide how
much politics is too much.
Kennedy came down in between. He says
that he finds partisan gerrymandering
troubling, but that the Texas plan was not so
extreme as to be unconstitutional.
Before 2003, he pointed out, the Democrats
had drawn electoral districts that gave them
a slim majority of seats in Congress at a time
when nearly 60% of Texans were voting
Republican. Measured against that map,
DeLay's plan "can be seen as fairer,"
Kennedy said.
Developers and property-rights activists
hoped a more conservative court, bolstered
by Roberts and Alito, would sharply limit
the Army Corps of Engineers' control over
hundreds of millions of acres of wetlands.
Environmentalists feared the same.
Scalia wrote an opinion to do just that, and
he was joined by Roberts, Thomas and
Alito. He said federal environmental
protection extended only to wetlands that
were part of a continuously flowing stream.
This would exclude many wetlands in the
middle part of the nation and nearly all of
those in West, where streams are dry for
much of the year.
But in this case, Kennedy refused to go
along. Instead, he wrote in a separate
opinion that wetlands could be protected as
long as environmentalists could show that
filling them or draining them would affect
downstream waters.
Earlier this year, Kennedy and O'Connor
thwarted the Bush administration's move to
void the nation's only "right to die" law.
Oregon's voters had twice approved a
measure that allowed dying people to obtain
a dose of lethal medication from their
doctors.
Bush's first attorney general, John Ashcroft,
reinterpreted the federal drug control law
and said it empowered him to strip Oregon's
doctors of their right to prescribe
medication.
In January, Kennedy, speaking for the court,
overturned Ashcroft's order. The
administration's position, he said, would
"delegate to a single executive officer the
power to effect a radical shift of authority
from the states to the federal government to
define general standards of medical practice
in every locality."
Had Kennedy agreed with Roberts, Scalia
and Thomas to support Ashcroft's view, the
court would have split 4-4 and could have
held the case until the next month, when
Alito took O'Connor's seat. Then a 5-4
majority could have ruled in the
administration's favor.
Kennedy, who turns 70 this month, joined
the court after a tumultuous confirmation
battle. In 1987, Reagan's first nominee,
Robert H. Bork, was defeated in the Senate.
His second, Douglas H. Ginsburg, withdrew
after reports that he had smoked marijuana
regularly as a law professor.
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Kennedy, a Sacramento native with a
reputation as a straight arrow, was
nominated next and won unanimous
confirmation in the Senate.
At first, he looked to be a reliable
conservative, voting regularly with then-
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist. But in
1992, he split with the conservatives and
voted with O'Connor to uphold the right to
abortion and to maintain the strict ban on
school-sponsored prayers.
Since then, many on the right have portrayed
him as a traitor. Their ire grew in recent
years when Kennedy voted to strike down
the death penalty for defendants who are
mentally retarded or younger than 18 at the
time of the crime.
He also wrote the court's two major rulings
in favor of gay rights. In one, he said gay
and lesbian couples deserved respect and
dignity, not condemnation by law. Scalia
denounced his opinion as the first step
toward same-sex marriage.
Despite the fiery exchanges over social
issues, Kennedy has some conservative
views that could loom large in the years
ahead. For example, he has voted regularly
against affirmative action, arguing that the
government should not rely on race in
making decisions. In the fall, the court will
consider a challenge to voluntary school
integration programs, and Kennedy could
create a majority for the conservative bloc.
Last year, he voted to uphold the display of
the Ten Commandments on public property.
O'Connor joined a 5-4 majority to strike
down such displays. Now, with Alito having
replaced her, the court, with Kennedy,
appears to have a majority to uphold
religious displays.
The abortion issue also appears to turn on
Kennedy's vote. Though he agreed in 1992
to maintain the legal right of women to
choose abortion, he also said states had
considerable authority to regulate it.
Six years ago, he disagreed with O'Connor
when the court struck down a Nebraska law
that banned intact dilation and extraction,
which opponents call "partial-birth
abortion." Kennedy called the practice
"abhorrent" and similar to infanticide.
Congress then passed a federal ban on this
form of abortion. It was struck down by
federal courts relying on the Nebraska
ruling.
This fall, the Supreme Court will take up an
appeal. Kennedy, as usual, will probably
hold the deciding vote.
Major Decisions This Session
Key Supreme Court decisions in the just-
concluded 2005-2006 session, and how the
justices voted:
War on Terrorism
President Bush overstepped his authority
when he set up special military courts to try
Al Qaeda suspects without the approval of
Congress, the court said in Hamdan vs.
Rumsfeld. These tribunals at Guantanamo
Bay lack basic standards of fairness, the 5-3
majority said.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the opinion
and was joined by Anthony M. Kennedy,
David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen G. Breyer. Justices Antonin Scalia,
Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. Alito Jr.
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dissented. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.
did not participate because he had ruled on
the case when it was before the U.S. appeals
court.
End of Life
Doctors in Oregon may prescribe lethal
medication for people who are terminally ill
and near death, the court said in Gonzales
vs. Oregon. The 6-3 ruling upheld the
nation's only "right to die" law and rejected
a Bush administration order that would have
stripped doctors of their license to prescribe
drugs.
Kennedy wrote the opinion, joined by
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, O'Connor and
Breyer. Scalia, Thomas and Roberts
dissented.
Wetlands
Federal environmental regulators may
protect most wetlands from development if
they can show that these swampy areas have
some impact on the nation's rivers and lakes.
The split ruling in Rapanos vs. U.S. rejected
a move by property rights advocates to
sharply cut back on environmental
protection.
Kennedy wrote the key concurring opinion,
and Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer
sided with the government. Scalia, Roberts,
Thomas and Alito would have limited the
protection for wetlands.
Redistricting
State lawmakers have broad power to
redraw the lines of electoral districts to
benefit the party in power, the court said.
The five-member majority rejected a charge
of "partisan gerrymandering" lodged against
the Texas Republicans and former House
Majority Leader Tom DeLay for a mid-
decade change that gave the GOP six
additional seats in Congress.
Kennedy wrote the opinion in League of
United Latin American Citizens vs. Perry,
and Roberts, Scalia, Thomas and Alito
agreed with him.
Campaign Funding
The government may not cap how much
candidates spend for their campaigns, and
contribution limits are illegal if they are too
low, the court said in striking down a novel
Vermont law. The 6-3 ruling was a defeat
for liberal reformers who wanted to lessen
the impact of money in politics.
Breyer wrote the opinion in Randall vs.
Sorrell, and Roberts, Alito, Scalia, Kennedy
and Thomas agreed with him.
Whistle-blowers
Public employees do not have a free-speech
right to complain about serious wrongdoing
in the workplace, the court said in Garcetti
vs. Ceballos. The 1st Amendment protects
employees when they speak out in public as
citizens, but not for internal matters, the
court said in its 5-4 ruling.
Kennedy wrote for the majority, which
included Roberts, Scalia, Thomas and Alito.
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer
dissented.
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"Swing for the Bleachers'
Slate Magazine
July 1, 2006
Dahlia Lithwick
The new John Roberts Supreme
only one term old and yet already
wrong about it.
Court is
we're all
Liberals had feared, and conservatives had
feted, the end of judicial review as we know
it, at least until this week's blockbuster
ruling on the scope of presidential war
powers in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld proved that
bit of conventional wisdom wrong,
practically before it had become
conventional. Predictions of a new era of
hands-off judicial minimalism may have
been premature.
Yes, we are seeing the expected shift to the
political right with the replacement of
moderate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor by
conservative Justice Samuel Alito. But,
more significantly, the role of swing justice
has itself swung from O'Connor to Justice
Anthony Kennedy. On virtually all the most
divisive issues, today's court is now a
Supreme Court of One.
Yes, Kennedy has inherited the power to
decide crucial cases, and he's started to show
us this term what that might mean. In
Hamdan he joined with the court's left wing
to invalidate the military tribunals President
Bush had concocted for the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay. The majority opinion he
joined, authored by John Paul Stevens, was
neither minimalist nor mild: "In undertaking
to try Hamdan and subject him to criminal
punishment, the Executive is bound to
comply with the Rule of Law that prevails in
this jurisdiction."
But more crucially, Kennedy has
appropriated O'Connor's trick of writing
either an opinion or a concurrence that goes
on to become the law of the land. O'Connor
was famous (and not always in a good way)
for signing on to an opinion, but on narrower
grounds than the other four justices in the
majority. The trick is that the justice who
decides the case most narrowly then speaks
for the whole court. And that's how
O'Connor imprinted her views on an awful
lot of jurisprudence.
But unlike O'Connor, who invariably pooh-
poohed her pivotal role on the court (always
claiming that she had only one vote, like
every other justice), Kennedy is said to
relish it. In his controversial book Closed
Chambers, Edward Lazarus, a former clerk
for Harry Blackmun, claimed that Kennedy
actively seeks out these pivotal positions on
the court, deliberately staking out positions
that would make him a "necessary but
distinctive fifth vote for a majority."
The fact that Kennedy is not rigidly moored
to any one easily classified ideology or
interpretive theory has led to some
spectacular defections from the court's
conservatives, every one of which stand as
festering sores for his conservative critics.
This was, in their minds, Robert Bork's seat,
after all.
It was Kennedy who allied with justices
David Souter and Sandra Day O'Connor to
preserve the core holding of Roe v. Wade,
and it was Kennedy who authored the court's
most sweeping defense for decriminalizing
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gay sodomy. And Kennedy, reversing
himself, who voted with the court's liberals
to strike down the death penalty for
juveniles and for the mentally disabled.
Kennedy also authored a crucial church/state
opinion prohibiting sectarian prayer at a
public-school graduation.
The fact that Anthony Kennedy is rumored
to be somewhat suggestible-easily
influenced by his colleagues, the media, his
affection for foreign things-makes his critics
even more nervous. It sometimes makes his
fans even more so: Adam Cohen recently
wrote of him in the New York Times that, at
the very least, "there is something refreshing
about a justice who genuinely seems to have
an open mind." But since when is doing
justice meant to be a refreshing enterprise?
If Edward Lazarus was correct in
characterizing some vital Kennedy decisions
as the fruits of "a tug-of-war for Kennedy's
mind" between his law clerks, just imagine
how fascinating it has become to see that
same, higher stakes, tug of war playing out,
not only behind the oak doors of judicial
chambers but in the courtroom, in the
newspapers, and among the justices
themselves.
From James Dobson, who famously called
Kennedy "the most dangerous man in
America," to oral advocates at the court,
who increasingly respond to the justice at
oral argument with a reverence usually
reserved for conversations with the Burning
Bush, efforts to influence Kennedy are no
longer limited to case conference. The
hottest game in current Supreme Court brief-
writing is to quote Kennedy gratuitously and
often. Even if you find yourself citing an
asterisk in the footnote of a Kennedy
dissent, inserting something flattering to
Kennedy is almost as important as running
the spell check.
The other justices are playing the quote-
Kennedy game, too, presumably in hopes of
wooing him to their side and keeping him
there. Read the opinions and dissents in
Rapanos v. United States, the major Clean
Water decision that came down earlier this
month. Embedded within are coded love
notes to Kennedy.
The justices may also be cozying up to
Kennedy in other ways: He won himself
some sweet writing assignments this term
(data from the Georgetown Supreme Court
Institute's term overview shows him
authoring five of the term's most "high
profile" opinions. Most of his colleagues
authored one or two). Some court-watchers
have suggested that the bizarre trio of
Stevens, Kennedy, and Chief Justice
Roberts, who jointly issued a strange
concurring opinion in the refusal to hear
Jose Padilla's case this past April, was yet
another effort by the court's liberal and
conservative leaders to show Kennedy more
love. Roberts is a savvy insider who knows
that over the years the abuse heaped upon
the court's moderates from the right has
pushed them into the arms of the court's
liberals. Make no mistake about it: Justice
Kennedy is now being love-bombed.
And what is the crucial swing voter doing
with these newfound superpowers? Let's do
the numbers. While it's still too early to
predict, the invaluable annual end-of-term
tally done by SCOTUSblog, and the
numbers from Georgetown, show that
Kennedy voted with the majority in 88.4
percent of the cases this term. Only the chief
justice had a better record (see Walter
Dellinger's discussion of that fact here).
Kennedy authored eight majority opinions
(only Scalia authored more) and seven
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concurrences, more than any of his
colleagues. Moreover, in the court's 11 5-4
cases decided this term, Kennedy was in the
majority 75 percent of the time. But again,
that's also only half the story. The other half
is how Kennedy used that vote to shape the
law.
It was Kennedy who provided the fifth vote
in Hudson v. Michigan, an amazing criminal
law case in which he voted with the court's
four reliably conservative jurists-Roberts,
Alito, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence
Thomas-to hold that the remedy for police
violations of the centuries-old "knock and
announce" rule, required whenever the cops
serve a warrant, was, in effect, nothing. But
while Scalia's majority opinion showed a
readiness to forever end the practice of
throwing out evidence illegally obtained by
the police, Kennedy's moderating fifth vote
put on the brakes by insisting, in a separate
concurrence, that the general rule of
excluding evidence gained illegally was not
in jeopardy. Future challenges to the
exclusionary rule may hereinafter be posed
to a Supreme Court of one.
Kennedy provided the key fifth vote in the
term's major environmental case, Rapanos et
al. v. United States. The case tested the
authority of the Army Corps of Engineers to
enforce the Clean Water Act, and the court's
four conservatives would have dramatically
curtailed the corps' powers. It was Kennedy-
again writing separately-who refused to go
as far as Scalia, again, urged. In fact,
Kennedy left open the possibility of far
broader regulation than his colleagues would
tolerate. And thus it was Kennedy whose
opinion in Rapanos will become the
standard for the Army Corps as it fashions
future policy. Looking forward to next year's
big greenhouse-gases case, which explores
whether the Environmental Protection
Agency has an obligation to regulate carbon
dioxide, an attorney for the Sierra Club has
already suggested that "Rapanos means we
will write our brief for Anthony Kennedy
and maybe a little bit for Roberts."
Kennedy's was the moderating, and
controlling, fifth voice again in LULAC v.
Perry, the cacophony of a Texas
redistricting case, where he sided with the
court's conservatives to defeat the claim that
Tom DeLay's mid-census redistricting
festival was unconstitutional. But he joined
with the liberals to find that a new
congressional district violated the rights of
Hispanic voters, and he held open the
prospect of some future hypothetical
gerrymander that really would offend the
Constitution. The lesson again: Anyone
mounting a political redistricting challenge
will need to persuade a court of one.
And probably most important, Hamdan,
perhaps the most consequential separation-
of-powers case in recent memory, again
pivoted on Kennedy's vote. He sided with
the court's liberals but again refused to go as
far as they would have led him.
So, then what does all this nipping and
tucking, shucking and jiving mean for
Kennedy and the court? It's still just too
early to tell. He clearly intends to fill the
shoes recently vacated by O'Connor; shoes
she in turn inherited from Justice Lewis
Powell. They each played the role of
moderating a polarized court; building
bridges, navigating toward the center-a
center where most of the nation was most
comfortable. Each took abuse for that when
they sat on the court. Each was largely
celebrated for it when they retired. Kennedy,
too, appears poised to hold that center
together. Indeed more often than not, he
seems to be leaving his options open, laying
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the groundwork for revisiting these issues
more fully in the future, as he becomes more
comfortable in this role.
A lot of the soaring, Keatsian Kennedy
rhetoric of the previous years' opinions that
once brimmed with the language of the
ineffable glory of unflinching human dignity
and such seems to have been toned down of
late, as well. But then, perhaps Justice
Kennedy doesn't need to write about the
ineffable glory of anything, anymore. He
can finally just sit back and bask in it
instead.
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